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Julie A. Sparks

SHAW FOR THE UTOPIANS,
CAPEK FOR THE ANTI-UTOPIANS
The continuing argument between utopian writers who prefigure the
Millennium and the anti-utopian writers who prophesy the approach of
Armageddon is generally assumed to be a struggle between wide-eyed
optimism and misanthropic pessimism. But the profoundest thinkers in
each camp sometimes find, after a prolonged engagement with their
dialogic opposites, that their tents are pitched on common ground-that
a Hegelian synthesis has occurred wherein the seemingly irreconcilable
positions have merged into a guarded but life-affirming optimism. One
such reconciliation can be found in the dramatic dialogue between
Bernard Shaw, representing the utopians, and Karel Capek (1890 
1938), a Czech anti-utopian writer with Luddite tendencies and conser
vative religious views who respected Shaw's work but disagreed with
some of its deepest philosophical underpinnings. They began working
out their different visions of humanity's future independently, both
weighing the unprecedented destructive ferocity of World War I against
the great promise of the early twentieth century's technological advances
and exploring humanity's prospects in a utopian-dystopian format.
Both also employed their own variations on biblical themes--Creation,
Armageddon, and the achievement of the Millennium-to illustrate
their different conclusions. Eventually, however, they were drawn into a
dialogue that focused on a question central to utopian and anti-utopian
discourse: Should humanity strive for a secular millennium, struggling
to re-create man and society into the image suggested by our brightest
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hopes, or should we content ourselves with the status quo and wait
patiently for divine orchestration to work out our destiny?
Their essential disagreement on this point stems in part from their
very different concepts of humankind's progress. As J. L. Wisenthal
explains in his study of Shaw's dialectic dramatic method, "His perspec
tive is evolutionary, and he thinks in terms of progress toward goals
rather than their actual attainment. In an evolutionary world no stage is
final, and in a neo-Lamarckian evolutionary world the human will is
always aiming at something higher." 1 In contrast to this evolutionary
outlook, Capek agrees with the prophet of Ecclesiastes that there is
nothing new under the sun, and he found evidence for this belief even
in a London art museum. In his Letters from England, written after his
trip there in 1924, he wrote, "How awful a discovery to find the
perfection of man even at the very beginning of existence; to find it in
the formation of the first stone arrow, to find it in a Bushman drawing.
. . . [D]readful is the relativity of culture and history; nowhere behind
us or before us is there a point of rest, of an ideal, of the finish and
perfection of man; for it is everywhere and nowhere, and every spot in
space and time where man has set up his work is unsurpassable." 2 There
could hardly be a more radical divergence of perspective than this,
and it led the two writers to present very different interpretations of
humanity's distant past and hypothetical future, especially when they
became aware of each other's work and squared off for a theological
battle. Nevertheless, the first arguments in the debate did not begin
as such.
Between 1918 and 1920 Shaw labored on an immense work, a five
play cycle called Back to Methuselah, in an effort to provide a modern
credible religion that could guide us all out of the error and folly that
seemed to have brought us so close to the edge of doom during the
Great War. The resulting work was his "metabiological pentateuch"
which begins "In the Beginning" with a re-working of the Genesis myth
and extends "As Far as Thought Can Reach" to a far-distant future
when humankind has evolved into god-like Ancients who live for centu
ries in their serene, intensely intellectual utopia. Although Shaw's history
of humankind recognizes the power-mad, wantonly destructive Cain
element in our early stages, he shows how the truly vital, creative
element finally prevails and pulls humanity onward and upward straight
past the tidy millennia! societies that the socialist utopian reformers were
dreaming about. The last play of the cycle, As Far as Thought Can Reach,
ends with a prophecy that some super-evolved humanity, discarding the
bodies that encumber it, will eventually spread to populate the stars.
Although many critics objected that the utopia of Shaw's Ancients is
not a very appealing goal to strive for and that Back to Methuselah only
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demonstrated Shaw's misanthropy, Shaw seriously intended to offer
modern man hope that through willing ourselves to be better, we could
ascend the evolutionary ladder from the Yahoo to the Houyhnhnm stage
of intellectual and spiritual development. Thus understood, Shaw's
Creative Evolution is probably the brightest optimism that could be
maintained in the aftermath of Neo-Darwinism and the Great War.
In 1920, the same year Shaw finished his utopian pentateuch, Capek,
writing in Czechoslovakia, finished his first anti-utopian play, R. U.R.
(Rossum's Universal Robots), wherein he, like Shaw, evaluates twentieth
century millennial ambitions and Apocalyptic fears employing a modern
version of biblical motifs. In Capek's own words, he meant to write "a
comedy, partly of science, partly of truth. The old inventor, Mr. Rossum
. . . is no more or less than a typical representative of the scientific
materialism of the last century. His desire to create an artificial man-in
the chemical and biological, not the mechanical sense-is inspired by a
foolish and obstinate wish to prove God to be unnecessary and absurd.
Young Rossum is the modern scientist, untroubled by metaphysical
ideas; scientific experiment is to him the road to industrial production,
he is not concerned to prove, but to manufacture."s
This scenario develops into a dark cautionary tale. Young Rossum,
hoping to free humanity from toil and establish a leisurely millennial
society on android labor-and to make a fortune in the process-is at
first phenomenally successful. But the utopian scheme creates too much
leisure and renders humans obsolete. Recognizing this, the robots rise
up and destroy humanity, then realize that they too soon face extinction
because they are not designed for reproduction. Yet the play ends with
a life-affirming miracle as two of the robots metamorphose into love
struck humans. Ending where Back to Methuselah begins, this Adam and
Eve go forth to renew and repopulate the earth.
Although the central concerns of Back to Methuselah and R.U.R. are
very different, both feature automatons that are created in a laboratory
to resemble human flesh and intellect very closely-more "androids" in
the current use of the term than the metallic, mechanical beings usually
implied by the term "robot" (a Capek-coined word from the Czech
"robota" for "forced labor, drudgery"), although the robots hold a much
more central position in Capek's play. In Methuselah the automatons
appear in only one scene of the last play of the cycle, As Far as Thought
Can Reach, and they live only briefly before they turn vicious, kill their
creator, and then die. In Capek's play, however, the robot revolution
easily upstages the human characters' petty concerns, giving the play a
more "science fiction" feel and a more coherent focus than Shaw's
eclectic, rambling chronicle could achieve.
Despite their differences, the two plays were linked in the public's
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consciousness when, in 1922, both were given their American debut (it
was a world premiere for Methuselah) by New York's Theatre Guild
Shaw's in February and March, Capek's in October. One reviewer with
the New York Herald noticed an affinity between the two plays immedi
ately, observing that R. U.R. "has as many social implications as the most
handy of the Shavian comedies," while a reviewer with the New l'Ork
American goes so far as to assert (rather snidely) that "Bernard Shaw did
not write R . U.R . but he probably will. Possibly later on we shall have a
variation of R. U.R . by Mr. Shaw and then what we accepted last night as
an exceedingly enjoyable and imaginative fantasy will become a dull
diatribe."4 Yet the two playwrights who were being discussed together in
New York both insisted later that they remained unaware of each other's
work for some time, and the evidence seems to support this.
R.U.R.'s principal motif-man-made automatons that try to overthrow
their creators-<:an be traced back to much earlier influences. One
obvious possibility is the medieval Jewish folk-tale of the Golem, a clay
manikin brought to life through cabalistic magic to defend the Jews of
the Prague ghetto. Since a German film version of this legend was being
shown widely in Czechoslovakia in 1920, the year Capek wrote R .U.R. ,
its influence on the play seems probable.5 Another obvious precedent is
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (the New York TiTMS critic titled his review "A
Czecho-Slovak Frankenstein"). Probably the closest previous literary
precedent, however, describes, like Capek's play, a society that reaches
for the utopian ideal of universal leisure by relegating most of the labor
to manufactured automatons: Edward Bulwer-Lytton's anti-utopian
novel, The Coming Race (1871). Although we can only speculate whether
Capek may have had access to this novel, precedents for his robots are
certainly in evidence. When Bulwer-Lytton's narrator first encounters
the highly advanced society several miles underground, he reports, "In
all service, whether in or out of doors, they make great use of automaton
figures, which are so ingenious, and so pliant to the operations of Vril
[an energy source], that they actually seem gifted with reason. It was
scarcely possible to distinguish the figures I beheld, apparently guiding
or superintending the rapid movements of vast engines, from the
human forms endowed with thought."6
We do know that Shaw was familiar with Bulwer-Lytton's novel, and
he tells us in a speech he delivered to the Fabians in 1933 that he
borrowed from it the idea that one possible key to a utopian society is
"mutually assured destruction" at the personal level-that is, if each
member of society could kill with a thought, that society would have to
make sure it arranged its institutions carefully so that all members would
be content with their lot, and the race would have to develop a high
degree of self-control and a horror of killing or it would self-destruct in
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short order.7 We see this awful power being demonstrated on a small
scale in the fourth play of the Methuselah cycle, Tragedy of an Elderly
Gentleman, just before Shaw's "coming race" finally decides that it must
humanely but implacably exterminate the more primitive species of
humanity that has failed to evolve this power Uust as Capek's robots
decide to exterminate the human race). Although Bulwer-Lytton draws
a utopia that many socialist reformers (including Shaw) would approve
of, his anti-utopian message-that humankind is constitutionally incapa
ble of either establishing or living in such a perfect society-would
appeal more to Capek, as he makes clear in his later dystopian works.
It is important to note, however, that even at this early stage of his
career, Capek seemed to be working with the same biblical motifs Shaw
used in his utopian works, and the plot similarities that result between
R.U.R. and Methuselah are striking, particularly in their revision of
Genesis. For example, Capek's robotic Adam and Eve prove their worthi
ness to take on the grave responsibility of regenerating the species by
demonstrating their willingness to die for each other-in a scene with
parallels in Shaw's In the Beginning and As Far as Thought Can Reach. The
scene is pivotal in Capek's play, providing the deus ex machina device
that prevents a species-wide tragedy as God mercifully decides to give
humankind a second chance despite the disastrous effects of our greed
and hubris. Just as the last remaining human, Alquist, has completely
given up hope of rediscovering the lost robot formula and despairs that
life will perish from the earth, he discovers that a young robot couple,
Helena and Primus, seem to have developed a crucial human quality:
they are in love with each other. They don't know what is happening to
them, but it is clear to the audience from their behavior and is proven
in a classic test when Alquist tells them he must dissect one of them to
save the robot race, and each begs to be the sacrificial victim so that the
other might live. Finally Primus declares "I won't allow it. You won't kill
either of us, old man .... We-we-belong to each other." Alquist then
sends the pair out into the world with a benediction: "Go, Adam. Go,
Eve-be a wife to him. Be a husband to her, Primus." In case we did not
catch the biblical allusion, Alquist proceeds to read from Genesis: "And
God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good."
This receives special emphasis because it is Capek's principal theme, in
this and all of his anti-utopian works. Alquist voices Capek's challenge to
the worshipers of technology when he asks (rhetorically, since they are
all dead), "[G]reat inventors, what did you ever invent that was great
when compared to that girl, to that boy, to this first couple who have
discovered love, tears, beloved laughter, the love of husband and wife?"
Finally, on his knees, Alquist thanks God that his eyes have "beheld Thy
deliverance through love, and life shall not perish!"8
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Although Shaw's version of Genesis is quite different in many re
spects, there is a strong parallel to what Alquist describes as "this first
couple who have discovered love . . . beloved laughter, the love of
husband and wife." In Shaw's Eden these phenomena (and many others)
are also discovered, and words are found for them by the very articulate
Serpent, who also explains to Eve how they can reproduce their kind.
(This secret Alquist delicately leaves the robot couple to discover for
themselves.) Also like the robots, Shaw's Adam and Eve are faced with
the threat of extinction, for we meet them the morning they discover
death in the garden. This discovery makes them suddenly terrified for
the other's safety, and like Primus, Adam is especially protective: "You
must never put yourself in danger of stumbling," he tells Eve. "I will
take care of you and bring you what you want. "9 After discovering the
feelings of uncertainty and jealousy, the two discover (like the robots)
that they belong to each other, so they invent marriage, and the Serpent,
like Alquist, supplies the titles "husband" and "wife" (18).
If we skip from the first to the last play of Shaw's cycle, As Far as
Thought Can Reach, we see another sort of "first couple" that resembles
Capek's: the automatons created by Pygmalion. Although physically

superb, they are morally defective, for the most part, as haughty and
self-centered as thoroughly spoiled children. When reproached for
killing their creator, they respond as the Bible's Adam and Eve do
when reproached for their disobedience: they try to blame each other.
However, they manage to rise briefly to the level of Helena and Primus
when the very superior He-Ancient, taking Alquist's role, presents them
with the same ultimatum: "Now listen," he says, "One of you two is to be
destroyed. Which of you shall it be?" "Spare her; and kill me," the male
figure responds. "Kill us both," urges the woman, "How could either of
us live without the other?" (243). As it happens, they do both die, for
they are deeply flawed creatures who cannot live among the super
evolved Ancients, but Shaw's play ends on a note that is as emphatically
life-affirming as Capek's. Lilith, another character Shaw has appro
priated from biblical legend and radically reinterpreted, sounds a bit
like Alquist when she declares, reverently and exultantly, "Of life only is
there no end; and though of its million starry mansions many are empty
and many still unbuilt . . . my seed shall one day fill it and master its
matter to its uttermost confines. And for what may be beyond, the
eyesight of Lilith is too short. It is enough that there is a beyond" (262).
Although both plays are in their different ways life-affirming, they
clearly take opposite positions on the issue of humanity's role in shaping
its own destiny. Shaw does not believe God could really survey creation
and declare it "good" in the same sense that Capek means it, which is to
say "quite good enough for us." Like most utopians, Shaw believed that
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both humanity and human society needed to be vastly improved and
that our duty as humans (in his view, gods in embryo) is to strive
continually toward that end. Shaw expresses this belief in defending "the
divine force of curiosity" in an earlier preface (to The Doctor's Dilemma):
I have always despised Adam because he had to be tempted by
the woman, as she was by the serpent, before he could be
induced to pluck the apple from the tree of knowledge. I should
have swallowed every apple on the tree the moment the owner's
back was turned. When Gray said "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis
folly to be wise," he forgot that it is godlike to be wise; and since
nobody wants bliss particularly, or could stand more than a very
brief taste of it if it were attainable, and since everybody, by the
deepest law of the Life Force, desires to be godlike, it is stupid,
and indeed blasphemous and despairing, to hope that the thirst
for knowledge will either diminish or consent to be subordi
nated to any other end whatsoever. 10
Capek, conversely, seems to be asserting in R.U.R. that striving to be
"godlike" is not only ill-advised but downright sinful-a classic expres
sion of the kind of willfulness and pride that led to our Fall in the first
place. Capek soon added another anti-utopian play to the argument in
his next work, The Makroupolous Secret.
In 1922, the same year that the New York Theatre Guild produced
Methuselah and R .U.R., Capek's Makroupolous Secret had its debut in
Prague. Like R.U.R., it was immediately considered in relation to Methu
selah (especially the third play of Shaw's cycle, The Thing Happens)
because it demonstrates how extreme longevity would be a curse to
humanity. Capek was rather insistent in the play's preface that he had
heard only sketchily of Shaw's play when he was writing his, but the plot
similarities suggest otherwise. Both plays feature a woman who has
taken a step toward immortality-each can live for three centuries
without any decrease in vigor or change in appearance after the first
forty years or so-and both plays focus on evaluating whether that
miracle would be a blessing or a curse were it more widespread in the
race. As before, both playwrights take diametrically opposed positions
on the desirability of humankind's striving to achieve this miracle. Shaw
believes our survival absolutely depends on our developing the level of
maturity and sense of social responsibility that only a very long, vigorous
life can provide, while Capek insists it is not only ill-advised but down
right sinful to aspire to more than our traditionally allotted three score
and ten-Adam and Eve were, after all, driven from Eden to prevent
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their eating from that second forbidden tree, the one that would grant
eternal life.
Despite the diametrically opposed themes, however, the two plays
contain several remarkably similar plot elements. Most striking is the
exact period of longevity in both plays: three centuries. It really looks as
if Capek was being clever in pretending to arrive as this figure by
"coincidence" because Shaw begins the second play of his pentateuch,
The Gospel of the Brothers Barnabas, with this same coincidence: the two
brothers who have been developing their plan for the salvation of
humanity decide independently but simultaneously that we must achieve
life-spans of three centuries if we are to survive as a species. When
Conrad bursts into his brother Franklyn's study with this announcement,
Franklyn says, "Now that is extraordinary. . . . The very last words I
wrote when you interrupted me were 'at least three centuries' " (37-38).
Unfortunately, the two are interrupted before Franklyn can answer his
brother's question, "How did you arrive at it?" Could this be another
instance of the artists' intuitive synchronity? Or did Capek appropriate
at least this detail from the "resume" of Shaw's play that he says he read
in 1921?
The other plot parallels may simply have followed logically from the
similar situation depicted. Anyone who lives for a couple of centuries
would experience similar difficulties and thus could be expected to
respond with similar stratagems if forced to live among people of
normal life-spans. Accordingly, we find Shaw's Mrs. Lutestring, who
survives from the day of the Brothers Barnabas to the distant future of
the next play, The Thing Happens, describing problems similar to Emilia's.
Both must periodically stage a death and adopt a new persona to allay
the suspicions of short-livers; both must suffer the loss of beloved
friends and family who age and die in the usual way; both finally become
emotionally detached from their numerous progeny and, indeed, from
all short-lived people, who begin to seem rather tediously childish; and
both acquire a mysterious power of inspiring awe and fear in ordinary
mortals, who cannot help feeling their own inferiority in the presence
of these majestic, goddess-like women. Perhaps certain other plot details
are also inevitable, arising from the conflict between the desire for
eternal youth and the fear of the unknown. Thus, both plays contain
characters who consider with trepidation how this phenomenal longev
ity, if it became widespread in the population, would wreck the current
political structure; both contain moving passages that describe the un
bearable brevity of the traditional life-span and the great potential for
human improvement that any significant extension could make possible;
both plays refer to a race of "supermen"; and both plays include
characters who are not brave enough to face the prospect of a three
century life-span.
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Despite all these similarities, the playwrights come down on opposite
sides of the question of whether this is a desirable development, whether
the possibilities for human improvement that greater longevity could
provide-the striving for a nobler quality of life, even an approach to
godhead-are worth the risks and the burden involved. In order to
present their very different answers to this philosophical question,
the playwrights had to present their heroines' characters somewhat
differently. Shaw suggests that a longer lifetime would produce wise,
goddess-like women by describing Mrs. Lutestring as "a handsame woman,
apparently in the prime of life, with elegant, tense, well held-up figure, and the
walk of a goddess. Her expression and deportment are grave, swift, decisive,
awful, unanswerable. She wears a Dianesque tunic ... [T]he men, who rise as
she enters . .. incline their heads with instinctive awe" (113-14). Her interac
tion with the short-livers bears out this description of her awful magnifi
cence and shows that she is quite capable of bearing the grave
responsibility of establishing and maintaining a utopia. When the rela
tively ineffectual and shallow president, Burge-Lubin, speculates that
"The complications must be frightful. Really I hardly know whether I
do want to live much longer than other people," Mrs. Lutestring replies
regally, "You can always kill yourself. ... Long life is complicated, and
even terrible; but it is glorious all the same. I would no more change
places with an ordinary woman than with a mayfly that lives only an
hour" ( 119).
Capek is more terse in his stage directions than Shaw, so we hear of
Emilia Marty's magnificence only from the other characters, but they all
rave about her beauty, her charisma, her marvelous singing voice (she is
an opera diva), and, as with Mrs. Lutestring, the instinctive fear she
inspires. Even without stage directions, however, one director seems to
have captured what Shaw describes as the irresistible psychic force that
longevity would produce in a woman like this. The effect is reported
precisely in Walter Kerr's review of the 1957 New York revival of the
play. In describing the scene wherein Emilia is confronted by an old
lover of hers, now elderly, Kerr says, "Miss [Eileen] Herlie rests on a
chaise-longue, turned thoroughly away from us. The old sport's eyes
meet hers. In the intake of a breath, and a few seconds' silence,
something happens between them-something strong enough to blow
the frail gallant backward, like a windblown dandelion, into the lap of
the nearest onlooker.'' 11 Shaw presents a very similar scene in the fourth
play of the cycle, Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman, between an ancient
oracle and some presumptuous short-livers who fall to their knees in
terror and awe when she is revealed to them.
Despite these similarities, however, Shaw's and Capek's heroines are
very different people. We can see just how different Capek's heroine is
from the "Dianesque" Mrs. Lutestring when Gregor, a character who
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has been so unfortunate as to have fallen passionately in love with
Emilia, raves, "I am terrified of you.... There is something dreadful
about you... . You are vicious, low, awful, you are a callous animal. ...
Nothing means anything to you. Cold like a knife. As if you'd come out
of a grave." 12 It is significant that while Shaw invokes the imagery of
Greek mythology-and specifically a goddess "chaste and fair" (al
though really Athena would have been a more appropriate model}
Capek presents Emilia as a vampire. Both are immortal and awe
inspiring, but only one is admirable. While Shaw's heroine works hard,
devotes herself to the future of humankind, and finds the effort "glori
ous," Capek's heroine is locked in the tail-chasing aimlessness of narcis
sism. We are not terribly surprised when we find the other characters
pitying Emilia her fate, as Gulliver pitied the Struldbruggs, when Emilia
cries, in the last act, "One should not, should not, should not live so
long! .. . One cannot stand it. For 100, 130 years, one can go on. But
then ... then . . . one finds out ... and then one's soul dies." The soulwithering truth she discovers is that "one cannot believe in anything.
Anything" (173). Acute ennui has turned to nihilism and the despairing
conclusion that "People are never better. Nothing can ever be changed.
Nothing, nothing, nothing ever really matters" (174). Considering how
Shaw's estimation of modern man had suffered from the grim spectacle
of World War I, he could never have preserved his essential hopefulness
had he agreed with Emilia on this point. He had to believe radical
improvement to be possible or despair over the future of the race
because, as Stanley Weintraub put it, Shaw had come to believe humanity
was engaged in a "race between Utopia and catastrophe." 1s
Considering the striking plot similarities, the diametrically opposed
positions the two plays take on utopian aspirations, and that The Makro
pulos Secret was published in 1922, a year after Methuselah appeared in
print, it is easy to see how Capek's play could be so widely assumed to be
a direct rebuttal of MethuseUJ.h. Capek therefore felt it necessary to insist
in the preface to his play that he was actually inspired not by Shaw but
by "the theory of Professor Mecnikov [Metchnikov] . . . that old age is
autointoxication of the organism." He mentions this, he explains, "be
cause this winter there appeared a new work by Shaw ... which so far I
know only from a resume, and which also-Qn a scale apparently much
more grandiose--treats the question of longevity." 14 He adds, "This
coincidence in subject is entirely accidental, and, as it would seem from
the resume, purely superficial, for Bernard Shaw comes to quite the
opposite conclusions" (112). It should be noted, however, that Capek
may have first heard of Metchnikov from an earlier Shaw play, The
Doctor's Dilemma, where Shaw mentions him in discussing the latest
theories of immunization, in both the play and preface. Since The
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Doctor's Dilemma was written in 1906 and first translated into German in
1908, it is reasonable to suppose that Capek may have read it or seen it
performed before he wrote The Makropulos Secret, whether he would
later remember the Metchnikov discussion or not.
Although Capek is quite explicit in pointing out that his position on
the longevity question differed from Shaw's, he goes on to explain how
the two playwrights, although one is utopian and the other anti-utopian,
could both be seen as "optimists." Although he acknowledges that
"Shaw's thesis will be received as a classical case of optimism" while his
will be labeled "pessimism," he mildly explains that
In my comedy I intended, on the contrary, to tell people
something consoling and optimistic. I do not know if it is
optimistic to maintain that to live sixty years is bad, while to live
three hundred years is good; I only think that to declare that a
life of sixty years (on the average) is adequate and good enough
is not exactly committing the crime of pessimism.... Perhaps
there are two kinds of optimism: one which turns away from
bad things to something better, even dreams; another, which
searches among bad things for something at least a little better,
if only dreams. The first looks straight off for paradise; there is
no finer direction for the human soul. The second searches
here and there for at least some crumbs of relative good;
perhaps this effort is not quite without value. (112)
This is a diplomatic effort to reconcile the two opposing attitudes, and
indeed some important similarities can be found between the habits of
thought and theories of their art professed by these otherwise very
different people. There is, for example, the striking similarity in their
statements that assert the necessity for artists to reject a simplistic
absolutism. In his preface to Plays Pleasant, Shaw declares that "the
obvious conflicts of unmistakable good with unmistakable evil can only
supply the crude drama of villain and hero, in which some absolute
point of view is taken, and the dissentients are treated by the dramatist
as enemies to be piously glorified or indignantly vilified. In such cheap
wares I do not deal. Even in my unpleasant propagandist plays I have
allowed every person his or her own point of view, and have, I hope to
the full extent of my understanding of him, been as sympathetic with
Sir George Crofts [the "villain" of Mrs Warren's Profession] as with any of
the more genial and popular characters in the present volume" (3: 111).
Capek makes a very similar assertion about the kind of morally compli
cated conflict he wanted to dramatize in R.U.R. After explaining each
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major character's particular ideological stance and declaring them all to
be "right," Capek explains that
the most important thing is ... that all of them are right in the
plain and moral sense of the word. Each . . . has the deepest
reasons, material and moral, for his beliefs, and according to his
lights seeks the greatest happiness for the greatest possible
number of his fellow-men. I ask whether it is not possible to see
in the present social conflict of the world an analogous struggle
between two, three, five , equally serious verities and equally
generous idealisms? I think . . . this is the most dramatic element
in modern civilization, that a human truth is opposed to another
truth no less human, ideal against ideal . . . instead of the
struggle being, as we are so often told it is, between noble truth
and vile selfish error. 15
This agreement on objective relativism for the sake of truth in art did
not preclude disagreement on other important philosophical issues.
Nevertheless, Capek's report of his first visit to Shaw's flat in London
describes the beginning of a friendship that appears to have been warm
and respectful on both sides. It is also clear that Shaw's pentateuch was
still in Capek's mind. He describes the great Irishman much as Shaw
describes his Ancients: "an almost supernatural personality. . .. He looks
half like God and half like a very malicious satyr, who however, by a
process of sublimation extending over thousands of years, has lost all
that is too closely akin to nature." 16 He confesses to having felt actually
afraid since he had "never seen so unusual a being," but he was also
charmed, concluding that Shaw "sparkles with life and has heaps of
interesting things to say about himself, about Strindberg, about Rodin,
and other famous things; to listen to him is a delight coupled with awe"
(183). After returning to Prague, Capek wrote Shaw a letter urging him
to "put your interest in our country in order." Referring to their meeting
in London, Capek repeats his original assessment of Shaw's Czech
translator, offering to help find a more trustworthy one and inviting
him to come and see a Prague production of Man and Superman. A later
letter indicates that Shaw took this advice about the translator. 17 But
their mutual friendship and respect did not bring them any closer to
accord on their basic philosophical disagreement about the legitimacy
of utopian aspirations, and in 1927 Capek carried the debate back onto
the stage, producing his most emphatically anti-utopian play, Adam
the Creator.
This time there is no questiQn about coincidental influence. Adam the
Creator is clearly a conscious, deliberate refutation of Shaw's entire
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utopian oeuvre from his treatment of the Superman, to his faith in
willed Creative Evolution, to his mystical, human-centered In the Begin
ning. The play opens with the violent end of the world as we know it
when the Adam of the title, disgusted with the "petty, miserable human
race," writes a manifesto proclaiming "all order, all customs and institu
tions bad, null, and void ... every effort to improve or change the world
order is cowardly compromise ... life is a bad habit." 18 Then he loads
his Cannon of Negation and blows up the world. The empty wasteland
that results disconcerts him somewhat, but he concludes defiantly, "Yes,
it was badly made, and I've abolished it" (15). This remark is not allowed
to pass: God's voice thunders down a command that as a penalty for his
presumption, Adam must create the world anew himself, from the clay
on which he kneels. Still in the grip of Darwinism, Adam hurrumphs,
"As if one could create life out of clay! It's clear he has no idea of
modern biology" (17). Yet when life does not appear spontaneously out
of the clay, as he expects, Adam takes on the role of Creator with relish.
"Let's skip this monkey-stage of human beings!" he cries, and instead
sets out to make a "Superman," then changes his mind and makes a
Superwoman instead, named Eve (19). Here we get a reprise of Henry
Higgins and Eliza, for once she is completed, the woman turns on her
creator and refuses to acknowledge his claims on her, prompting Adam
to complain "Why, I with my own hands created her, and all there is in
her is my big words; and if you please, she now puts on to me these lofty
airs!" (28). None of Adam's other creations turns out any better: the
Nietzschean Ubermensch, Miles, scorns his creator as an inferior crea
ture and runs off to the hills with Eve; the sweet, womanly little Lilith
becomes a tediously clinging wife; and Alter Ego, intended as a friend
and collaborator, becomes a critic and a rival (since he is as opinionated
and argumentative as Adam).
Alter Ego proves to be Adam's most significant creation, however,
because he finally persuades Adam to let him create, too. Operating on
different artistic principles, Adam and Alter Ego produce two different
races of men. Adam creates artistic, anarchic individualists while Alter
Ego manufactures identical, lock-step collectivists who march in step
and whistle the same tune, the one Alter Ego whistled as he made them.
This essential dichotomy brings intensified discord into this new world
because both races have been created with all of mankind's old propen
sity toward bigotry, so they bicker over which has the greater claim to
being "real people." Adam's people claim to be "Personalities," "Souls,"
"Images of God," while Alter Ego's declare themselves ''the New World,"
"the Mass," and most crushingly (twisting Shaw's hope-inspired religion
of Creative Evolution) "creative revolution"! (115).
These blank myrmidons were not at all what Shaw had in mind when
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he expounded his theory of Creative Evolution, but Capek, like many
other anti-utopians of his time, equated any willful reorganization of
the social order with totalitarian uniformity. This places Capek firmly in
the mainstream of his anti-utopian contemporaries because, as Lyman
Tower Sargent points out, "[t]he tendency in this century has been to
equate utopia with force, violence, and totalitarianism." 19 Sargent adds
that "Much of the original basis for the antiutopian position came
from anti-communism or anti-fascism. It was transformed first by the
coalescence of these two positions into an anti-totalitarian position, and
transformed second by the development of dystopia" (26). Accordingly,
Capek's play contains a scene that specifically demonstrates the danger
that utopian efforts might pave the way for powerful tyrants: the scene
where Miles returns from the hills. This Superman, instead of leading
the newly created human race to the highest possible intellectual and
spiritual development, drags it back to the level of the angry ape,
introducing modern warfare just as Shaw's Cain does in Act II of In the
Beginning, and as Shaw's Napoleon Cain Adamson continues to threaten
in the thirty-first century in Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman. But while
Shaw introduced the Cain figure only to show an atavistic type of
barbarian to be resisted and eventually left behind, Capek presents
Miles (whose name, derived from the Latin word for "soldier," suggests
his inherently bellicose nature) to help drive home his point that the
besetting difficulty of changing the world is that we can never eradicate
the inherent flaws of human nature: hubris, aggression, lust for power
and glory, and even defeatism and misanthropy.
While the Cain type of person is subject to the first two flaws, utopian
aspirants like Adam are subject to the latter two. Like all the would-be
world-betterers before him, Adam had eagerly written ideas for five
different kinds of Golden Ages in little notebooks-he names Plato,
Bakunin, and Marx as inspirations-but he becomes demoralized trying
to realize his schemes and advises the equally sanguine Alter Ego not to
bother: "You can write it down so beautifully; you can write down
whatever you want, but the moment you begin to put it into practice--"
(84). And that seems to be Capek's principal theme. Capek's play is
unusual in its expressionistic approach to the subject, but the anti
utopian use of the Edenic motif is not surprising for the period, for as
Sargent explains, "Some dystopias . . . can be seen as a continuation of
the idea of original sin. Ejected from the Garden of Eden, unable to
return and unable to achieve a secularized version of it, [the anti
utopians believe] the human race is incapable of utopia" (26).
But Capek gives the play an optimistic, comic denouement. When
Adam and Alter Ego find themselves in the position God held at the
beginning of the play-first denied credit for being Creators, then
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reproached for the flawed world they produced-they almost decide to
destroy the world again but are finally won over by a sublime rdigious
festival of the people (who worship their creators with an abstract,
slightly garbled tribute to their real genesis). Humbled and uplifted at
the same time, Adam promises God to leave the world as it is. And God,
given the last line of the play, says "So will I!" (183). Although Adam the
Creator failed on the stage, it was translated into English in 1929 and was
popular as a book, and it seems fair to assume that at this point in their
acquaintance, Shaw would have received his own copy from the author.
In 1932 Shaw produced an odd little novella, The Adventures of the
Black Girl in Her Search for God, wherein he again takes up the issue that
Adam and God wrangle over in Capek's play and exposes some rhetori
cal sleights of hand Capek had used in presenting his case. In Shaw's
novel, an intelligent, inquisitive, clear-eyed African girl meets a succes
sion of God-figures who represent stages in the evolution of our concep
tion of the deity. The second of these is the God revealed in the book of
Job, and the Black Girl naturally asks him Job's question (which is also
Adam's complaint in Capek's play): "I want to know why, if you really
made the world, you made it so badly." And God answers according to
tradition (and Capek): "Who are you, pray, that you should criticize me?
Can you make a better world yourself? Just try: that's all." 20 The Black
Girl is not abashed as Job and Capek's Adam are. She points out that
this response is not an answer or an argument, "it's a sneer." She adds
"I don't mind your laughing at me . .. but you have not told me why
you did not make the world all good instead of a mixture of good and
bad.... If I were God there would be no tsetse flies. My people would
not fall down in fits and have dreadful swellings and commit sins"
(14). Because he can make no satisfactory answer to this question, she
concludes that he is no God but an imposter and continues on her quest.
In the postscript, Shaw affirms this conclusion, asserting that "God's
attempt at an argument is only a repetition and elaboration of the sneers
of Elihu, and is so abruptly tacked on to them that one concludes that it
must be a pious forgery to conceal the fact that the original poem left
the problem of evil unsolved and Job's criticism unanswered, as indeed
it remained until Creative Evolution solved it" (90). According to Shaw's
scheme of development, Capek's deity would probably be classified with
Micah's, who tells the Black Girl of a God who requires only that we "do
justice and love mercy and walk humbly with Him." She finds this is a
great improvement over Job's God, but still insufficient, for he does not
provide the answer she seeks. "But doing justice and shewing mercy is
only a small part of life when one is not a baas or a judge. And what is
the use of walking humbly if you don't know where you are walking to?"
she asks Micah (23).
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We cannot know what Capek would have replied to this because he
died only a few years later, in 1938, and his widow had to burn his
letters to prevent their falling into the hands of the Nazis and implicating
Capek's correspondents in his anti-Fascist agitations. But Shaw was not
finished with the argument. Shaw's last utopian play, Farfetched Fables,
written almost twenty years after The Black Girl, returns to the biblical
motifs of Armageddon and the Millennium that the Shaw-Capek debate
had employed. Despite his steadfast repudiation of Capek's anti-utopi
anism, Shaw's final vision of utopia synthesizes Capek's appreciation for
ordinary humankind with more rarefied Shavian aspirations. Shaw
deprecates Farfetched Fables as a "few crumbs dropped from the literary
loaves I distributed in my prime," but it seems more than coincidence,
considering that Capek's Adam had been subtitled "A Comedy in Six
Scenes and an Epilogue," that Shaw's last utopia takes the form of six
little fables rather than the three- or one-act plays he usually produced.
Like Capek's play, Shaw's begins with a vision of an Armageddon that,
although cataclysmic, is not final: the last four fables show how human
civilization rebuilds itself from its own ashes.
Despite these similarities, however, the distinction between utopian
and anti-utopian remains. While Capek shows civilization revived with
all its flaws, Shaw depicts one that has evolved onto a somewhat higher
plane, and this society shares the universe with the Ancients of Methu
selah who have managed to continue their evolution into disembodied
spirits, or "thought vortexes," to use Shaw's term. After the initial
Apocalypse, each fable shows how our development progressed from
"the dark ages that followed the 20th century," each describing a new
strategy for world-bettering: an advanced science for measuring and
classifying human potential, improved diet, and eugenic manipulation
in the lab to create "the Just Man Made Perfect." The fifth fable revives
an idea presented at the end of Methuselah, for one of the eugenic
scientists decides that "we shall never make decent human beings out of
chemical salts.. . . We must get rid of our physical bodies altogether." 21
Like the Ancients, he longs to be a disembodied spirit, a "vortex in
thought." It was this theme in Methuselah that led critics to declare Shaw
a misanthrope since it looks as if he is proposing to empty the universe
of human life altogether. Yet this fable ends with a forward-looking
assertion that echoes Lilith's and is, in its own Shavian way, life affirming:
"The pursuit of knowledge and power will never end" (511 ).
It may appear at this point that Shaw remains an unrepentant utopian,
defying Capek's contention that ordinary human life is enough, but the
final fable is the crucial point in the Shaw-Capek debate because it
contains a synthesis of their two kinds of optimism-their two versions
of humanism-and presents the two positions in a way that shows them
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to be complementary. The last fable is set in a school for advanced
children where a sort of Socratic schoolmarm conducts a lively anarchic
debate that ranges through epistemology, history, and biology to evalu
ate the theory of the Disembodied Races, which holds that some of the
highly advanced people we saw in the fifth fable did manage to escape
their bodies to become "Thought Vortexes" although they continue to
interact with ordinary humans, "penetrating our thick skulls in their
continual pursuit of knowledge and power, since they need our hands
and brains as tools in that pursuit" (517). The teacher accounts for the
problem of evil in the world-the Job question-by explaining that "the
pursuit of knowledge and power involves the slaughter and destruction
of everything that opposes it," and the opposition arises because "even
the vortexes have to do their work by trial and error. They have to learn
by mistakes as well as by successes" (517). Then one of the thought
vortexes materializes as "a youth, clothed in feathers like a bird" who
announces that he is Raphael, "an embodied thought. ... What you call
the word made flesh" (519). His motive is simple curiosity to "know what
it is like to be a body," for even among the immortals, "Curiosity never
dies" (520). After this brief visitation, the curious being vanishes back
into the infinite, and the ordinary human youths and maidens are sent
off to read the Book of job for next Friday. Since the theory of the
Disembodied Races has at least partiaUy explained the pain and evil that
remain in the world, much of that ancient story's power will, no doubt,
be lost, but the teacher presents it not as a theological text but as an
example of clever rhetoric. Here, then, is the most optimistic vision of
humanity's prospects that Shaw could devise when the destruction of
Hiroshima had provided a preview of Armageddon and the hope was
fading, even for an old Fabian like Shaw, that communism could bring
about a millennia! society.
Things had looked even grimmer in the final years of Capek's life as
the Nazis swept through Europe and crushed his country. During a
period of despair Capek wrote The White Illness (1937), which Harkins
describes as an anticipation of Fascism's triumph: "half gruesome fan
tasy, half dystopian image" (150). Yet Capek absolved himself from "the
charge of pessimism," for he wrote The Mother in 1938, a play that ends
with a stirring call to defend the ideals of liberty. He sounds even more
defiantly optimistic in his essay "The Crossroads of Europe," also written
in 1938, wherein he seems to have joined forces with the utopian
idealists in his own country, especially T. G. Masaryk, a friend since the
1920s. With a nationalistic and humanistic fervor that departs radically
from his usual mild, ironic, understated tone, Capek writes,
This democratic spirit, this love of liberty and of peace, is part
and parcel of the very character of the Czechoslovak nation.
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Over and above that, however, T. G. Masaryk, the Liberator and
first President of our Republic, made those things the moral and
political program of our people. For him ... politics represented
a realization of love of our fellow men; in his eyes democracy
and liberty were based on respect for man, for every man; they
issued from recognition of his immortal soul and the infinite
value of human life; for Masaryk the ultimate goal of all honest
politics and all true statesmanship was to bring about the King
dom of God on earth . ...22
It would be facile to say that his dialogue with Shaw had finally van
quished Capek's objections to the idea of ordinary humans striving to
establish a millennia! society without waiting for divine intervention.
Certainly the influence of Masaryk and the threat of Fascism also had
their impact. But the dauntless hopefulness expressed here testifies to
the power of the sort of optimism Shaw's utopian works continued to
assert. Shaw himself, who lived to see all the brutality of the Holocaust
and the horror of Hiroshima, retained his stubborn belief in humanity's
prospects to the end. His final words on the subject, the last lines of the
"What Is My Religious Faith?" chapter of his autobiographical Sixteen
Self Sketches, could be taken as a manifesto for all utopians: "Creative
Evolution can replace us; but meanwhile we must work for our survival
and development as if we are Creation's last word. Defeatism is the
wretchedest of policies. "28
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